Without OTPSERVER, new accounts get no OTP seed, the seed page says OTP
is not configured, and the seed API returns 503. Everything else works
as before. If OTPSERVER is set, ADMIN_SEED, ADMIN_NAME, ADMIN_REALM
and USER_REALM are required and startup fails without them.
The test helpers hardcoded dc=ungleich,dc=ch. They now build DNs from
ENTIRE_SEARCH_BASE, so the suite can run against ungleich's test server
(dc=my-domain,dc=com) by overriding settings through the environment.
The TLS tests depend on the local dev LDAP and its CA, so they skip
themselves when LDAPSERVER points elsewhere.
New customer entries always got ldapPublicKey, which needs the
openssh-lpk schema. Production has it; ungleich's test server only
loads core, cosine, inetorgperson and nis, so registration failed
there. LDAP_USER_OBJECT_CLASSES (space separated) defaults to the
production set, inetOrgPerson posixAccount ldapPublicKey, and can drop
ldapPublicKey for servers without that schema.
Sample entries from production show:
- customers live in ou=customer (singular), not ou=customers
- customers have gidNumber 10004 and staff 10002; uidNumbers are in
the 10000s
- staff entries list organizationalPerson and person explicitly
- the servers serve ldaps:// on port 636
The app reads all of these from settings, so its behaviour is
unchanged; the customer entry it creates already matches production
attribute for attribute. The defaults and test setups were wrong:
env.sample, the Kubernetes ConfigMap (now ldaps:// without StartTLS,
gid 10004, start uid 10000), dev/env.dev and the dev LDAP seed now
mirror production. The made-up ou=groups is gone. The tests take the
customer DN and gidNumber from settings instead of hardcoding them.
ldap3 does not verify TLS certificates by default, and the app never
configured it to. ldaps:// and StartTLS were encrypted but accepted any
certificate, so anyone able to intercept LDAP traffic could pose as the
server and collect the admin password and every password used to log in.
All LDAP servers now use VerifiedTls, which leaves verification to
Python's ssl module: certificate chain and hostname, IP literals
included (ldap3's own matcher cannot handle IPv6 literals). It also
sends SNI and requires TLS 1.2 or newer. LDAP_CA_FILE adds a CA bundle
for a private CA. LDAP_TLS_VERIFY=False turns verification off, with a
logged warning. A failed StartTLS now always raises instead of
continuing in plaintext.
New tests against the dev LDAP cover ldaps, StartTLS and ldaps over an
IPv6 literal with the CA (and check the socket is encrypted), plain LDAP
over IPv6, rejection of an untrusted certificate (ldaps and StartTLS),
rejection of a hostname mismatch, and the opt-out.
Activation created the LDAP account and then requested an OTP seed in
the same try block. If the OTP server was unreachable, the user got an
error page although their account existed, and their next attempt
failed with "username taken". OTP errors are now logged, as non-201
responses already were, and activation still succeeds.
They are served by the first middleware, so probes, which use the pod
IP as Host, are not rejected by ALLOWED_HOSTS or redirected to HTTPS.
/healthz only shows the process is serving, so an LDAP outage never
restarts pods. /readyz returns 503 unless the database answers and an
LDAP server accepts the admin bind.
None of the calls to the OTP server set a timeout, so a hanging OTP
server blocked a web worker indefinitely. Each call now times out after
OTP_TIMEOUT seconds (default 10).
LDAPSERVER was documented as a space separated list, but the whole
string went into a single ldap3.Server. Logins worked (python-ldap
accepts lists), while registration and every write would have failed
with more than one URI.
settings.LDAP_SERVERS is now the split list, used through one ldap3
ServerPool per process: requests go to the first reachable server, a
server that is down is skipped for 60s, connections time out after 5s,
and with all servers down the pool gives up after two passes instead
of retrying forever.
python-ldap is a C extension that needs the OpenLDAP headers to build
(and needed a workaround in the Dockerfile). ldap3, which the app
already used for all writes, is pure Python.
dal.backends.LdapBackend keeps the django-auth-ldap behaviour: search
the uid in every LDAPSEARCH base as the admin DN, require exactly one
match, log in with the user's DN, and mirror givenName, sn and mail into
the local Django user. Empty passwords are rejected (LDAP treats them
as anonymous logins, which succeed).
LDAP_USE_TLS now applies StartTLS to every connection, including the
admin connection used for writes, not just logins.
Step 2 of the upgrade. Dependencies are bumped to their newest versions
compatible with Django 4.2.
Django 4.0 rejects cache_control applied directly to a view method, so
Index.get now wraps it in method_decorator. Without this the landing
page returns 500. A test now checks the no-store header.
SeedRetrieveCreate printed every submitted password to stdout, so it
ended up in container and server logs. The reset view logged complete
reset URLs at debug level, and those work as credentials until used.
The highest uidNumber was cached in dal/ldap_max_uid_file. That breaks
with more than one replica and is lost on every container restart. The
uniqueness check behind it searched base '' (the root DSE), which
OpenLDAP never matches, so nothing caught a stale file. The error path
also referenced a setting that does not exist.
Now a paged search over ENTIRE_SEARCH_BASE finds the highest uidNumber
on each activation. Numbering is unchanged: the next number is above
both LDAP_DEFAULT_START_UID and every existing uidNumber.
LDAP_MAX_UID_FILE_PATH is no longer used.
Registration only collided inside ou=customers, so a staff username
from ou=users could be registered again as a customer, creating two
accounts with the same uid. Check the whole tree (ENTIRE_SEARCH_BASE)
on the register form, in the create API, and again at activation in
case the name was taken in between.
The activation link carried base64-encoded username, password, names
and email, so plaintext passwords ended up in mail archives, browser
history and proxy logs.
Registration now hashes the password to {SSHA} immediately and stores
it in a new PendingRegistration table (migration 0002). The emailed
link is /activate/<token>/ with a random token only, and activation
writes the stored hash into LDAP. Pending entries expire after 24h,
like reset tokens. This also drops the PseudoUser/token-generator
workaround.
Links in emails sent before deployment stop working; those users must
register again.
ResetRequest.post took the username from a hidden form field and
changed that user's password without checking any token, so anyone
could take over any account with a single POST to /reset/.
Opening a valid reset link now stores the verified username in the
session (valid for one hour, cleared after use). The POST only acts on
that user and ignores the form field. Reset tokens now come from
secrets.token_urlsafe, and malformed links return 404 instead of 500.
The uid was formatted straight into search filters, so a password
reset for user '*' matched and changed the first entry in the tree
(staff accounts included). Escape filter values with
escape_filter_chars and DN values with escape_rdn.
Also fix the username pattern: [a-z|0-9|\-|_] allowed '|'.
Restore root requirements.txt pinned to what production runs
(Django 2.2, last patch 2.2.28) so the upgrade starts from a
reproducible baseline. Restore logs/.keep; the logging config fails
on a fresh clone without the directory.
The tests drive every view over HTTP against the real test LDAP:
login, registration and activation, data and password changes,
password reset, account deletion, the create API and OTP seeds.
Known bugs are recorded as expected failures:
- password reset POST changes any user's password without a token
- LDAP filter injection in reset (user='*' hits the first entry)
- activation link carries the base64-encoded password
- a username from ou=users can be registered again under ou=customers
