170 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
170 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
[[!meta title="My notebook firewall for the 36c3"]]
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It's time for the
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[36c3](https://events.ccc.de/congress/2019/wiki/index.php/Main_Page)
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and to verify that some things are in place where they should be.
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As some of you might know, I am using
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[IPv6 extensively](https://ipv6onlyhosting.com) to provide
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services anywhere on anything, so you will see quite some IPv6 related
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rules in my configuration.
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This post should serve two purpose:
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* Inspire others to verify their network settings prior to the
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congress
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* Get feedback from anyone spotting a huge mistake in my config :-)
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## The firewall rules
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I am using
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[nftables](https://ungleich.ch/en-us/cms/blog/2018/09/11/introduction-to-nftables/)
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on my notebook and the full ruleset is shown below.
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```
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table ip6 filter {
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chain input {
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type filter hook input priority 0;
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policy drop;
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iif lo accept
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ct state established,related accept
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icmpv6 type { destination-unreachable, packet-too-big, time-exceeded, parameter-problem, echo-request, nd-router-advert, nd-neighbor-solicit, nd-neighbor-advert } accept
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tcp dport { 22, 80, 443 } accept
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}
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chain forward {
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type filter hook forward priority 0;
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policy drop;
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ct state established,related accept
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ip6 daddr 2a0a:e5c1:137:b00::/64 jump container
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ip6 daddr 2a0a:e5c1:137:cafe::/64 jump container
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}
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chain container {
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icmpv6 type { destination-unreachable, packet-too-big, time-exceeded, parameter-problem, echo-request, nd-router-advert, nd-neighbor-solicit, nd-neighbor-advert } accept
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tcp dport { 22, 80, 443 } accept
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drop
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}
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chain output {
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type filter hook output priority 0;
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policy accept;
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}
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}
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table ip filter {
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chain input {
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type filter hook input priority 0;
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policy drop;
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iif lo accept
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ct state established,related accept
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tcp dport { 22 } accept
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tcp dport { 51820 } accept
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}
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chain forward {
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type filter hook forward priority 0;
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policy drop;
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}
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chain output {
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type filter hook output priority 0;
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policy accept;
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}
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}
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```
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## The firewall explained: IPv6
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Let's have a look at the IPv6 part first. In nftables we can freely
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define chains, what is important is is the **hook** that we use in it.
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```
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chain input {
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type filter hook input priority 0;
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...
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```
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The policy has the same meaning as in iptables and basically specifies
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what to do with unmatched packets.
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IPv6 uses quite some ICMP6 messages to control and also to establish
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communication in the first place, so the list for accepting is quite
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long.
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```
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icmpv6 type { destination-unreachable, packet-too-big, time-exceeded, parameter-problem, echo-request, nd-router-advert, nd-neighbor-solicit, nd-neighbor-advert } accept
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```
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As we are dealing with traffic that comes to my notebook ("hook
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input"), I want to allow any incoming packets that belong to one of
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the connections that I initiated:
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```
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ct state established,related accept
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```
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And finally, I allow port 22, to be able to ssh into my notebook,
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port 80 to get letsencrypt certificates and port 443 for serving
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https. When I am online, my notebook is reachable at
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[nico.plays.ipv6.games](https://nico.plays.ipv6.games), so I need the
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web ports to be open.
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As I run quite some test on my notebook with docker and lxc, I created
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a /64 IPv6 network for each of them. When matching on those specific
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networks, I jump into a chain that allows specific configurations for
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containers:
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```
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ip6 daddr 2a0a:e5c1:137:b00::/64 jump container
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ip6 daddr 2a0a:e5c1:137:cafe::/64 jump container
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```
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The **chain container** consists at the moment of the same rule set as
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the input chain, however this changes occasionally when testing
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applications in containers.
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And for the output chain, I trust that the traffic my notebook emits
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is what I wanted it to emit (but also allows malware to send out data,
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if I had some installed).
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## The firewall explained: IPv4
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In the IPv4 irea ("**table ip filter***) things are quite similar with
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some small differences:
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* I don't provides services on IPv4 besides ssh and wireguard (port 22
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and 51820)
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* There is nothing to be forwarded for IPv4, all containers use IPv6
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* Same logic for the output as in IPv6
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## Safe or not safe?
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Whether this ruleset is safe or not depends a bit on your degree of
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paranoia. I allow access to port 443 on which an nginx runs which then
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again proxies to a self written flask application, which
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might-or-might-not be safe.
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Some people argue to limit outgoing traffic and while this is
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certainly possible (whitelist ports?), often this does is rendered
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useless, as any command and control server can be reached on port 80
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and you probably don't want to block outgoing port 80 traffic.
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If you have any comments about it, I'm interested in hearing your
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feedback on [the ungleich chat](http://chat.ungleich.ch),
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[twitter](https://twitter.com/NicoSchottelius) or IRC (telmich).
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## Update 2019-12-24
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I forgot to allow loopback traffic in the original version, which
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breaks some local networking.
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[[!tag ccc firewall nftables ipv6]]
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